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Abstract: When the government makes a grant to a private charitable organization, does it
displace private giving?  This is one of the fundamental policy questions in public finance, and
much theoretical and empirical research has been devoted to understanding the relationship
between private donations and government funding. Under the classic crowding-out hypothesis,
donors let their involuntary tax contributions substitute for their voluntary contributions.  This
paper raises the prospect of a second reason: that the strategic response of the charity will be to
pull back on its fundraising efforts after receiving a grant. We develop a theoretical model to
show a charity that chooses its level of fundraising strategically will reduce fundraising in
response to government grants.  We then analyze data on tax returns of 474 social services
organizations and 245 arts organizations between 1982 and 1996. These two types of charitable
organizations differ in both the nature of the services they provide and in their reliance on private
donations and government grants. We find evidence that government grants to nonprofits are
causing significant reductions in fundraising efforts, after looking at different types of
fundraising activities.  This finding is important for two reasons.  First, it means that the behavior
of the nonprofit organizations is consistent with the predictions of an economic model within a
strategic environment. Second, it adds an important new dimension to the policy discussions on
the effectiveness of government grants to increase the services of charitable nonprofit
organizations.   Charities are not passive receptacles of contributions, as they have so often been
treated in the past, but are active players in the market for donations.  When the government
gives a grant to charities, we should take into account the behavioral response of the charity
itself, as well as the behavioral responses of the individual donors.
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When the government makes a grant to a private charitable organization, does it displace
private giving?  This is one of the fundamental policy questions in public finance, and much
theoretical and empirical research has been devoted to understanding the relationship between
private donations and government funding. The hypothesis underlying these studies is that
givers, who are also taxpayers, will use their tax-financed donations as a substitute for their
voluntary donations, thus reducing the net effectiveness of the grants.  This has been called the
crowding out hypothesis.
1  Recently, new research has begun to examine the role that fundraising
plays on the solicitation and receipt of donations by studying the theoretical structure of
fundraising and the marginal effectiveness of fundraising expenditures.
2  There is a natural
question that falls between these two literatures, namely, what is the behavioral response by
charitable fundraisers to receiving a government grant?  Do they increase or decrease fundraising
efforts?  If they decrease these efforts, perhaps this behavioral effect by fundraisers, rather than a
direct behavioral response by individuals, could be responsible for the crowding out observed.
In other words, could grants to charities be crowding out the fundraisers rather than the givers?
We explore this question theoretically and empirically.  The theoretical model examines
the role that fundraising plays in attracting private donations and the effect that government
grants have on the incentives, in equilibrium, to raise more donations.  We predict that an
increase in government funding should decrease fundraising efforts of the organizations, and that
this alone could generate the incomplete crowding-out that has been observed.
We then examine this prediction with extensive empirical research.  We analyze data on
tax returns of 474 social services organizations and 245 arts organizations between 1982 and
                                                          
1 For recent contributions, see Okten and Weisbrod (1999), Payne (1998, 2001), Steinberg (1991), Khanna, Posnett,
and Sandler (1995).
2 See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman (1982), Steinberg (1986, 1994), Rooney (1999), Tuckman (1998), Weisbrod and
Dominguez (1986), Andreoni (1998, 2001), and Straub (2001).2
1996. These two types of charitable organizations differ in both the nature of the services they
provide and in their reliance on private donations and government grants.  The arts organizations,
on average, rely more on private donations. The average annual level of private donations in
constant dollars is $5.6 million whereas the average government grants are $1.2 million; average
fundraising expenditures are $563,000.  Grants to these organizations are likely to be tied to
specific events, such as an exhibit or performance.  Social service organizations are quite
different.  They rely far more on government grants.  Average annual private donations are $1.7
million, average government grants are $2.7 million, and average fundraising expenditures are
$361,000.   Moreover, many grants to social service organizations often look quite similar to
government contracts to serve certain needy populations.  These organizations often have well-
staffed fundraising offices to apply for and administer these extensive grants and contracts.  By
considering very different structures of these two types of nonprofit organizations, we can get a
broader view of the questions at hand.
Our empirical results confirm the theory.  We first look at the effect of government grants
on aggregate fundraising expenditures. For the arts organizations, under a two stage least squares
specification, the results suggest an additional $1000 in government grants decreases fundraising
expenditures, on average, between $242 and $272 suggesting, an average maximum decline of
nearly 58 percent.  The results for the social services organizations, in contrast, suggest that
$1000 in government grants actually increases aggregate fundraising expenditures by about $19,
which is a small but statistically significant amount.  Second, we disaggregate fundraising
expenditures into three areas: fees paid to professional fundraising services, salaries of the
organization’s officers devoted to fundraising, and other fundraising staff and salaries.  Looking
at these three types of expenditures separately underscores the effects found for the arts3
organizations and, in two of the three categories, reverses the finding in social services
organizations.  A $1000 increase in grants to social service organizations decreases spending on
professional services by $32, decreases the cost attributed to officers by $10, but increases other
salaries by $11.  These results are consistent with the different organizational structures of the
two types of nonprofits.  In particular, grants reduce actual fundraising efforts by both arts and
social service organizations, but in social service organizations—which rely heavily on
government funding—the increased funding appears to be increasing the spending by other staff
to manage and administer the grants received.   Hence, contributions to charities may indeed fall
when they receive a grant, but our results suggest that the reason may lie with the charities’
fundraising efforts, not solely with the givers.
This paper is organized as follows.  Next we present our theoretical model, showing the
equilibrium response of charities to government grants.   Section II describes the data and
Section III sets out our empirical specification.  Section IV presents the estimation and section V
is a conclusion.
I.  Theoretical Model
Models on crowding out have typically assumed that individuals have complete
information on the menu of charities available and express their demands for the public goods
through their donations.
3  In developing a theoretical model of fundraising, therefore, one must
first ask why fundraisers are necessary.   In the model we present below, we appeal to an often
cited fundraising technique called “the power of the ask.”  That is, individuals and charities alike
report that givers give primarily because they are asked.  Stated differently, givers seem to have
latent demands to donate.  Until they are asked, this demand goes unexpressed.  
                                                          
3 See, for instance, Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1985), and Andreoni (1988).4
The model we present is based on models of advertising that reduce or eliminate
prohibitive search costs.  In these models, when a salesperson calls or sends a solicitation, the
search costs are eliminated and the purchase is made.  In our framework, individuals who may
have “always wanted to donate” but “didn't know the address” will be able to donate when
solicited by the charity.  
Suppose that charities differ qualitatively in the services they provide.  For instance, one
group that serves disaster victims may focus on providing more food than medicine and another
may put more emphasis on medicine than food.  Likewise, individuals differ in the quality of
charity they prefer, with some preferring the charity that provides more medicine and the other
preferring the charity that provides more food.
Next, we assume that individuals face high costs of finding the names and addresses and
qualities of charities.   Or, equivalently, they have good intentions to give to the charity but
procrastinate in doing so.
4  When a charity solicits a contribution from an individual, it reduces
this transaction (or procrastination) cost to zero for the giver.  For the sake of modeling, we
assume that individuals will not give unless they are solicited by the charity.  If they are solicited
then they will give, but how much they will give will depend on how close the charity is to their
ideal quality.  If they are solicited by more than one charity, we assume that they will give solely
to the charity nearest to their ideal.
5   Note that we only preclude giving without being solicited
as a convenience for modeling purposes.  If some people give without being solicited, then this is
                                                          
4 This assumption has precedence in the literature on advertising, which often assumes that an individual will not
exercise their demand for a good unless they receive an advertisement from a seller.  This can also be justified from
models of procrastination (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999a, 1999b), since a commitment to a charity may yield a
“warm-glow” to the giver before they actually mail the check.  Hence the benefits can flow before the costs are paid,
which is the prescription for procrastination identified by O’Donoghue and Rabin.
5 This assumption is for simplicity.  A giver with convex preferences could be better off giving to covex
combination of all who solicit, but of course giving the most to the charity closest to his/her ideal.  All the results
presented here follow with the more complex and realistic assumption.  The important aspect of the model is that
more fundraising by one charity will reduce the effectiveness fundraising by other charities.5
a windfall to the charity that can easily be absorbed into our model.  Fundraising is needed as
long as some people need to be asked.
We assume charities move first in setting their fundraising levels; that is, by selecting the
number of households to solicit.   Charities move simultaneously.   Given the solicitations
received, givers move second and play a standard Nash equilibrium giving game.
Let xi be an individual’s consumption of private goods, and let yij be i’s contribution to
charity j, where yij ³ 0 for all i and j.  Let qj be the probability that an individual is solicited by
charity j. We assume that higher q costs more in fundraising expenditures and that the marginal
cost is increasing.  The costs of fundraising are designated as Fj(qj), where F¢ > 0 and F
¢¢ > 0.
Finally, let Gj be the level of government grants received by charity j.  Thus, we can define the
level of the charitable services provided as





q .       (1)
We treat the quality indicator of a charity as a real number located along a line segment
of length one.  Use Lj Î [0,1] to indicate the location of charity j.  Individuals have a most
favored quality, say Li
* Î [0,1].  If d(Li
*,Lj) is some distance function, then we assume that the
utility an individual i gets from giving to charity j will be increasing in lij=1-d(Li
*,Lj).   In
particular, we assume preferences are of the form
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All else equal, this will imply that not only will an individual prefer to give to a charity that is
closer to her ideal quality, but she will also want to give more to it than one farther away.
6
Fundraising has two effects on donations.   On the extensive margin, it increases the
number of people who give to the charity by increasing the number of givers solicited.  On the
intensive margin, it increases the average value of l among givers by matching them more
closely to their ideal quality, thus tending to raise the amount given.   We assume that, although
charities do not know the L
* of any individual, they know the proportions of each type in society.
 Hence, we can think of fundraising as a random solicitation of individuals, such as through
mailings or telephone calls, and so any individual is equally likely to be solicited by the charity.
7 
Next, what are the objectives of the fundraisers?  If the providers of charity care about
producing charitable services, then they may be net revenue maximizers, choosing q to maximize
C, taking as given the fundraising of other competing charities.  On the other hand, managers of
charities may see fundraising as a “necessary evil” that they need to endure to provide services
they  value.   That  is,  the  objectives  of  the  charity  may  be  better  described  by  a  function
Vj=vj(Cj,qj) where ¶v/¶C > 0 and ¶v/¶q< 0, so that charities may not choose the level of
fundraising to maximize net revenues.  There is evidence this model of fundraising aversion may
be more appropriate for many organizations (Weisbrod 1988).  We can simplify this expression
by assuming that fundraisers maximize
                                                          
6 Notice also that (2) implies individuals only get utility from the charity they give to, not from the charities to
which they do not give, despite the fact that all charities are public goods.  If we assume preferences are separable in
all charities, so that the marginal rate of substitution between the charity one gives to and those one doesn’t is
independent of the level of charity raised by the others, then all of the results that follow extend to this case as well.
 Nonetheless, this is an obvious avenue for generalization in later work.
7 This is, of course, a simplification.  We could alternatively assume that each individual is targeted by the charity to
be solicited in a certain order and that this ordering is chosen strategically as well.  This would complicate the
analysis without providing any additional richness to our predictions.7
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where sj ³ 0 represents the disutility to the charity managers of engaging in fundraising.
To simplify the exposition, assume there are only two charities, 1 and 2, and two types of
individuals.  For the n1, type 1 individuals l11=1 and for the n2, type 2 individuals l22=1. For a
given (q1,q2) we know that the number of givers of type 1 to charity 1 will be n11(qi,qj)=q1n1 and
the number of type 2 givers to charity 1 will be n21(q1,q2)=q1(1-q2)n2.  Similarly, n22(q2,q1)=q2n2
and n12(q2,q1)=q2(1-q1)n1.  Given these numbers, and their own solicitations received, individuals
will maximize utility (2) subject to the budget constraint xi+piyij=mi, where 0 < pi £ 1 is the price
of a giving, which may be less than one due to the charitable deduction from income taxes, and
mi is i’s after-tax income.  Solving this maximization, and assuming identical individuals within
types, it is easy to find equilibrium contribution levels of the form
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where ¶fi1/¶q1 ¶fi1/¶q2 DQG¶fi1/¶G1 IRUL  Similar results hold for charity 2. That
is, in equilibrium, own fundraising increases own revenues but decreases a competitor’s
revenues.   Likewise, higher G will partially “crowd out” individual contributions.
We can turn next to the game among the charities.  The total contributions received by a
charity will be increasing in its own fundraising and decreasing in the fundraising of the
competing charity.  Thus, we assume that each charity will maximize
j j j k j j j s ) G ; , ( C V - = ,( 3 )
where Cj(qj,qk;Gj) is the equilibrium outcome of the subgame among givers. This will lead to
best reply functions by the charities of8
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By the second order conditions on maximizing (3), the denominator above is negative.  What
about the numerator?  Recall that q has two effects.  First is the extensive margin, by bringing
people into giving that otherwise would not give, and second in the intensive margin in moving
givers from the other charity to their more favored charity.  As the other charity solicits more, the
extensive margin will become less important. As it becomes more likely that any one person is
solicited by the other charity, it becomes less likely that they will give to your charity.  Hence,
any solicitation is less productive. Therefore, ¶
2Cj/¶qj¶qk £ 0 and ¶qj
*/¶qk < 0.  We will also
assume that -1 < ¶qj
*/¶qk.  This is similar to the types of stability conditions often invoked in
duopoly models.  These assumptions lead to the existence of a unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.  This is illustrated in Figure 1.


















Since individuals will be “crowded out” by government grants, we know that when they are
solicited they will give less when G is higher.  Hence, ¶
2Cj/¶qj¶Gj < 0 and dqj*/dGj  This
yields proposition 1.
Proposition 1. As government grants to a charity increase, fundraising efforts by that charity
will decrease.9
FIGURE 1: Equilibrium in a Model of Fundraising
This proposition is also illustrated in Figure 1.  Here G1
¢ > G1 and the best-reply function
for firm 1 shifts toward the origin.
8  Will crowding out be complete or incomplete? Suppose that
the charity kept its fundraising constant in response to a government grant.  Then, because the
grant is partially paid for by those who do not give to the charity, there will be an income effect
that will increase the total supply of the public good (see Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1985).
We just saw, however, that since marginal fundraising is less productive after the grant, the
charity will reduce q, leading to a decline in giving.  Will the charity ever reduce q so much that
total C after the grant is lower than it was before the grant?  The answer is no, and can be seen
with a revealed-preference argument.  In particular, it would have been possible for the charity to
put less effort into fundraising before the grant, thus raising less charity, which it did not choose.
So given an opportunity to get at least as much C with less effort q, the charity will surely take it.
                                                          
8 If we were to add the realistic assumption that there is increasing disutility to fundraising by the charitable
organization (since they prefer spending time providing the charitable services than fundraising), this shift would be








Hence, government grants will be incompletely crowded out in the presence of fundraising.  This
gives us the following proposition:
Proposition 2.  If the government increases its grant to a charity, the total level of charitable
services will always rise, although not by the full amount of the grant. This is due to a
combination of reduced fundraising and classic crowding out.
Note that we have assumed that there is no “warm-glow” from giving (Andreoni 1989,
1990).  All the results generalize, however, to an assumption of impure altruism in which people
give partly for the private pleasure of giving
9
Finally we turn to the issue of what determines government grants.  To complete this
model we would need to present a formal political model of democracy and policy formation,
such as Besley and Coate (1997).   In such a model the political process would suggest that
charities that are more in favor of the electorate are more likely to receive government grants.
Given the greater demand, they are more likely to engage in fundraising.  Hence, there should be
a strong correlation between Gj and åiyij and F.  This means that G, while exogenous to any one
giver, is endogenous to the equilibrium level of C in the economy.  This simultaneity will be a
factor in the empirical work.
II.  Nonprofit Data Set
The data on nonprofit revenues and expenses come from federal tax returns filed by IRS
Section 501(c)(3) organizations for the period 1982 to 1996 (excluding 1984).
10  Representing
                                                          
9 Here we can see that the strategic responses of charities to government grants could lead to crowding out even if
people care only for a warm-glow and, as a result, would not substitute involuntary for voluntary gifts.  If the
charities dislike the act of fundraising, then the income effect of a government grant means they can reduce the
unpleasant fundraising efforts.
10 The data may be obtained from the Urban Institute’s National Center for Charitable Statistics.  For a given year,
the returns are for firms whose accounting period ended between November of that year and October of the
following year.  The sample is stratified based on the asset size of the non-profits.  Most of the returns are tracked
are for non-profits with assets that exceed $500,000.  For each year, IRS randomly sampled the non-profit firms11
the largest part of the nonprofit sector, 501(c)(3) nonprofits are those organizations whose
purposes are religious, charitable, educational, scientific, or related to public safety testing.
11
The tax returns identify the amount the nonprofit received in private donations, government
grants, and fundraising expenditures for the year for which the return was filed.  Private
donations may come from individuals, estates, corporations, and/or other nonprofit organization.
Government grants include grants received from all levels of government, excluding
reimbursements for services provided by the nonprofit under a government contract.
12
The organizations have been classified in the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities.
We constructed two unbalanced panel data sets for organizations sampled by the IRS for more
than 4 years located in the 48 contiguous United States.  The first data set covers the following
arts organizations: art museums, other types of museums, performing arts groups (theater, dance,
etc.), and music groups.  The second data set covers social service organizations that are
concerned with: family or children, poor or homeless, elderly or disabled, crime or delinquents,
employment issues, and other types of human services and housing related services.  We picked
these two groups of organizations for several reasons.  First, they represent different types of
charitable goods and services insofar as the sectors of the population served.  As such, the type
of private donor attracted to giving to these different goods may also differ.  Second, the reliance
on government funding and private donations differs across these types of organizations.  Third,
given the structure of the arts organizations in the United States, these organizations are more
likely to be less multi-dimensional in their missions than many of the social service
                                                                                                                                                                                          
within each asset level.  As IRS’s budget for this study increased, the number of non-profit organizations tracked for
a given year also increased.  Data for 1984 were not collected for budgetary reasons.
11 An organization is required to file a tax return if its annual gross receipts are greater than $25,000 and it is not a
religious organization.
12 These types of payments are reported on a non-profit’s tax return under program service revenue.  Program
service revenue, however, is not limited to payments by the government; it covers any payment received by the non-
profit for the services provided.12
organizations.   For example, a dance troupe is concerned about performing dance and creating
new dance pieces for the dance troupe to perform.  A given social service organization may
provide several types of services such as providing food, shelter, and some level of community
reintegration for the homeless.  Although all three services are complementary, the sources of
funding for each of these services may be different.  For example, in the area of social services,
the government has become more involved in contracting out government provided services to
nonprofit and other types of organizations.  Thus, one of the activities for a social service
organization may involve performing services under a government contract that may be more
regulated than the services that would be provided if the organization received a government
grant.
As other authors have found, the IRS sample of nonprofit tax returns requires extensive
data cleaning. There are four major reasons for this need.  First, there are many zeros reported in
the measures of interest.  Given we are incorporating organization fixed effects in the regression
specification, it is important to have measures that change over time for each organization as we
will be measuring the average within effect across the organizations.  Moreover, we are
interested in studying those organizations that actively seek private donations and government
grants as well as report the expenditures associated with fundraising.
Second, there are divergent accounting practices among organizations that raise concern
about the comparability of the tax returns.  This stems from the fact that there is extensive
heterogeneity in size and level of professionalism in charitable organizations.  This also stems
from the fact that despite a requirement to file a tax return, a nonprofit is not taxed on revenues
raised primarily for the goods and services it provides. Thus, charitable organizations are treated
differently by the IRS relative to for-profit organizations.13
Third, even within the NTEE classification of the organizations, the types of
organizations that are considered a 501(c)(3) organization varies dramatically.  Thus, there are
organizations that may not operate in the manner suggested by the theory by seeking grants and
donations. For example, a professional society, although a nonprofit, is organized to provide
goods and services for dues-paying members.
Fourth, as with any data set, there are anomalies in the data that must be addressed.
Given the purpose of our study, we are interested in studying organizations that exhibit positive
private donations, fundraising expenditures, and government funding during the sample period.
We, therefore, used the following rules to exclude organizations from the sample:
13
1.  All organizations that report zero government grants for all years for which the
organization is in the sample.
2.  All organizations that report zero private donations and fundraising expenditures for
all years for which the organization is in the sample.
3.  All organizations that report zero fundraising expenditures during the sample period.
4.  All organizations that report zero government grants, private donations, and
fundraising expenditures for more than 75% of the years of data covered by the
sample.
5.  The first few years of organizations that report zero fundraising expenditures and
government grants, suggesting these organizations may have recently started and take
several years before seeking (or reporting) funding and government grants.
6.  A few organizations with very few years of positive fundraising expenditures and/or
government grants and other evidence of idiosyncratic accounting.
This leaves 2493 observations and 245 organizations for the arts data set and 4333 observations
and 474 organizations for the social services data set.  These organizations are located in the 48
                                                          
13 We also excluded organizations whose scope is national in purpose or is a national chapter of local organizations.
We identified these organizations by searching for the word “national” or “America” in the name as well as
identified other organizations that were believed by the authors to be national in scope.  We then confirmed these
organizations provided services nationally by reviewing their mission statements as obtained from their websites.
We also excluded organizations identified as a “foundation” if the organization did not receive any private donations
during the period under study.14
contiguous states with the majority of organizations located in New York, California, Ohio,
Illinois, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Texas.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the arts and social services organizations,
respectively. The amounts reported are in constant dollars (1996 is the base year).  Across all
organizations, the average fundraising expenditures represent an average of eight percent of
average private donations.
14  For the arts organizations, average private donations received by
the arts organizations are $5.6 million; art museums reported the highest average amount.
Average government grants are $1.2 million; art museums reported the highest average amount.
Average fundraising expenditures are $560,000; music organizations reported the highest
average amount.  In addition to private donations and government grants, program service
revenue plays an important role in the financing of these organizations. Unfortunately, the tax
returns do not identify the sources of the program service revenue. Our speculation regarding the
source of these monies is that the bulk is derived from ticket sales and not from government
contracts.
For the social service organizations, government grants play a bigger role in their funding
than private donations. Average government grants are close to sixty percent greater than
average private donations. Across all organizations, the average program service revenue is quite
high, representing, on average, 92 percent more revenue than government grants and 200 percent
more revenue than private donations. Given the nature of the nonprofit organizations under
study, we speculate that a large percentage of these revenues are derived from government
contracts.  We also suspect that the organizations that rely heavily on program service revenue
                                                          
14 In recent years, it has become more common to use the relationship between fundraising expenditures and a
nonprofit’s total revenues as a measure of whether a nonprofit “efficiently” provides its goods or services.  As such,
this could result in the nonprofit underreporting its fundraising expenditures to keep this ratio low.  To the extent the
nonprofit adopts a consistent method of reporting its fundraising expenditures during the sample period, the15
may offer several types of goods and services and that the goods provided using program service
revenue are complementary to the goods provided using government grants and/or private
donations.  Thus, the role and source of program service revenue for the social service and arts
organizations appear to be different.
Average private donations are $1.73 million; multi-purpose human service organizations
reported the highest average amount.  Average government grants are $2.71 million;
employment related organizations reported the highest average amount.  Average fundraising
expenditures are $178,000; multi-purpose human service organizations reported the highest
average amount.
Comparing the summary statistics for the arts and social service organizations, there are
several salient points.  First, the emphasis on private donations or government grants is different
for these organizations. Second, although the emphasis on funding sources is different across the
two types of organizations, the average total of these three sources of revenues for the arts
organizations is not that different from the average for the social services organizations.  The
average for the arts organizations is $11 million and the average for the social services
organizations is $9.6 million.  The average of the sum of private donations and government
grants is $6.8 million for the arts organizations and $4.4 million for the social services
organizations.  Thus, the reliance on private donations and government grants by arts
organizations is slightly more than by the social service organizations. Third, with the exception
of private donations, the coefficient of variation on the measures is greater for the social services
organizations.
15
                                                                                                                                                                                          
organization fixed effects will help to control for this anomaly.  In future versions of this paper, we will explore this
issue further.
15 The coefficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean, measures the relative
dispersion in the data.16
Figures 2 and 3 depict the average level of fundraising expenditures, government
funding, private donations, and program service revenue by year for the sample period for the
arts and social services organizations, respectively.  Given fundraising expenses are substantially
lower than the other measures, fundraising expenses are reported on a different scale (along the
right vertical axis). For the arts organizations, average private donations have grown over the
sample period, whereas government grants have remained fairly flat.  Average fundraising
expenditures have also grown steadily over the sample period.
For the social service organizations, at the beginning of the sample period, all four
measures were declining, reaching the lowest average level around the time of the 1986 tax
reform.  After the 1986 tax reform, average government grants increased, rising more sharply
than private donations.  Average private donations increased after the 1986 tax reform, but
remained relatively flat for most of the period.  The sharpest growth is seen in program service
revenue.  Average fundraising expenditures grew faster than government grants and private
donations but not as fast as program service revenue.
16  For both figures, there is no strong
evidence that as government grants have increased over time, fundraising expenditures have
declined.
We have also collected data at the state and/or zip code level to proxy the political,
economic, and demographic conditions under which the organizations operate.  All measures are
publicly available from various government publications.  The measures reflecting the political
conditions under which a nonprofit operates identifies the political party composition of the state
legislature and U.S. Congress, as well as well as the political party of the state’s governor and the
number of members on the U.S. Congressional Appropriations committees (Senate and House)
                                                          
16 Figures 2 and 3 illustrate a potential difference in the reactions by donors and the government to the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.17
representing the area in which the nonprofit is located.
17  The political measures proxy the
sentiment of the voters in a given state and are expected to address the distribution of
government funding across the organizations.  The state level economic and demographic
measures identify such things as per capita income, the unemployment rate, the population, the
percent of the population under 18, and the percent of the population over 65.  These measures
proxy the need for the goods and services provided by the organizations.
An additional set of measures we have collected identifies the level of government
transfers to individuals or nonprofit organizations.  The individual transfers reflect payments
related to: retirement and disability, Medicare, Medicaid, income maintenance (SSI, AFDC, food
stamps), unemployment insurance benefits, veterans benefits, and federal education and training
programs.  The transfers to nonprofit organizations reflect the payments by the federal and state
governments to nonprofit organizations.  The mean and standard deviation for these state level
measures are reported in Appendix Table 1.
III.  Empirical Specification
We use the data to test proposition 1. We utilize the following empirical model:
Fist =  i +  t +  *ist +  5ist +  'ist+  =ist +  it     (4)
where F is the real level of fundraising expenditures spent in year t by nonprofit i located in state
s, G is the real level of government grants in year t received by the nonprofit, R is the program
service revenues and D are dues and fees of the nonprofit, and Z is the vector of economic,
demographic, government transfers to individuals, and/or political measures for the state in
which the nonprofit is located.
                                                          
17 We hand collected data on the membership of the appropriations committees for both chambers of the U.S.
Congress.  For the Senate, we use the state represented by the Senator to identify whether a nonprofit organization
located within that state has a member on the committee.  For the House of Representatives, we identify by zip code
the areas within the congressional district represented by the representative and match this to the address of the18
The parameter b captures the effects of government funding on fundraising expenditures.
We allow government funding to be measured in the same period as the fundraising effort under
the assumption that there is a lag between seeking government funding and actually receiving the
funding. Because we have a panel data set, we included organization and year fixed effects.  The
organization fixed effects are designed to capture the time invariant heterogeneity in the
organizations such as their reputation, age, type, and/or method of operation that affects the
collection of funding and the use of fundraising expenditures.  The year fixed effects control for
macro level time varying shocks that affect all of the organizations similarly.
We also added values of program service revenue, R, and dues and assessments for the
nonprofit organizations, D.  These capture time varying characteristics that are not captured by
the organization fixed effects, such as other potential sources of revenue available for use by the
organization, other types of goods and services offered by the organization that may be
complements with or substitutes for the goods and services provided using government grants
and/or private donations, and the growth or down-sizing of the organization.
A.  Measurement Issues
As other authors have noted, although the data set we are using in this paper is rich given
the large number of firms we can study over time and the ability to segregate the organizations
into types of goods provided, the data set is not without problems. There are four potential
problems that we will address in our analysis.  First is timing.  The data are reported on a yearly
basis.  The timing of government funding, private donations, and the efforts expended towards
fundraising, however, may not fall within the same one-year period.  This raises the question of
whether we should lag government funding or modify the data such as taking a moving average
                                                                                                                                                                                          
nonprofit organization to identify whether the nonprofit organization has a member on the House appropriations
committee that is concerned with the area served by the nonprofit organization.19
of the measures.  Although we only report results using current dollars, the results are robust
regardless of whether we use a lag or a two-year moving average in government funding.
A second issue concerns the uses of the organization’s fundraising expenditures.  To
properly test the theory, the fundraising expenditures should only be used towards the collection
of private donations or funding unrelated to government grants.  The reporting instructions to
charities, however, define fundraising as “the total expenses incurred in soliciting contributions,
gifts, grants, etc.”  Hence, a nonprofit may include the costs associated with applying for
government funding as a fundraising expenditure or, worse, the costs of reporting and complying
with the conditions of the grants.  If this is the case, the coefficient on the fundraising measure in
equation (4) will have a positive bias.  We can address this by looking separately at the
components of fundraising costs reported by the charities.  There are three main components.
First are “professional fundraising fees” which are payments to outside organizations for
conducting fundraising or for consulting on fundraising.  These expenses most cleanly represent
the notion of fundraising expenses intended in the theoretical model.  Second is the portion of
officers’ salaries allocated to fundraising.   We presume that the officers would prefer to spend
effort on the nonprofits services rather than on fundraising.  Hence, we expect this expense to
decline as grants are received.   Third is the portion of overall salaries and wages allocated to
fundraising.   If this item were measured accurately, we would expect this also to decline as
grants are received.  We fear, however, that this item may also include expenses related to
maintaining a “grants office” that also administers grants once they are received.  To the extent
that these activities are included in this number, the coefficient may be biased in the positive
direction.
18
                                                          
18 To explore these issues further, we divided the data into three groups: those observations for which there are
positive private donations but zero government grants; those observations for which there are positive government20
A third issue concerns the fact that some government grants may be in the form of a
matching grant, whereby the nonprofit organization is expected to raise funding from other
sources to qualify for the government funding (or vice versa).  Given the nature of the data set,
we do not know if the government funding is tied to the charitable organization receiving a
matching grant.  To the extent that a given nonprofit organization consistently receives matching
grants, the organization fixed effects would control for this type of phenomenon.  In addition, to
the extent that there is a uniform switch in grant awards by all government agencies during the
period under study, the year fixed effects would control for this type of phenomenon.  If there are
matching grants that vary over time and within the firms, then the fixed effects will be of little
use in this regard and the coefficient on the fundraising expenditures will have a positive bias.
Fourth, given the fundraising expenditures are skewed towards zero, an OLS framework
may not be the best framework to use.  We, therefore, also use a Tobit specification to control for
this problem.
IV.   Estimation
In estimating equation (4) we expect to encounter problems of endogeneity.  In particular,
if the services of an organization are in high demand, such as the Red Cross after a hurricane, we
might expect demands for both private and public contributions to be high.  And, naturally, if
both demands are high, these organizations should increase pursuit of both public grants and
private donations.  In other words, unmeasured influences may be increasing both government
grants and fundraising.  To correct for this positive bias we will need to use instrumental
                                                                                                                                                                                          
grants but zero private donations; and those observations for which there are positive government grants and
positive private donations. On average, of fundraising expenditures are higher for the observations that report no
government funding than for the observations that report no private donations.  Fundraising expenditures are only
slightly higher for the observations that report both positive private donations and government funding.  Across all
three groups of observations, the ratio of fundraising expenditures to total revenues collected by the nonprofit is the
same (.01).21
variables.   In this section we first report results without controlling for endogeneity, and then
turn results for two-stage least squares regressions.
A.  OLS and Tobit Regressions.
Table 2 reports estimate of equation (4) from the OLS regressions and the fixed effects
Tobit specification for the arts organizations.  In each specification reported, we regressed
fundraising on a measure of government grants, program service revenue, dues assessments,
state political, economic, demographic, and individual government transfer measures, year, and
organization fixed effects.  In columns (1) and (3) we report the results from an OLS
specification.  In column (2) and (4) we report the results from the Tobit specification.  In all of
the specifications, we divided government funding by one billion and fundraising expenditures
by one million.  Thus, the coefficient on government funding represents the dollar increase in
fundraising expenditures per $1000 of government funding.
Across all four specifications, the results suggest that an increase in government funding
increases fundraising expenditures. Depending on the specification, the results suggest, on
average, a $1000 increase in government grants increase fundraising expenditures of about $4 to
$5 for social service organizations and about $10 to $12 for arts organizations.  Using the mean
of government funding and fundraising expenditures across all organizations, these coefficients
represents an average increase between one and three percent.
B.  Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation
As discussed above, there are several issues that suggest the OLS results may be biased
due to endogeneity or omitted variables in the specification. To address these issues, we estimate
equation (4) using an instrumental variables (“IV”) specification.  Under IV, in the first stage, we
predict the level of government funding based on a set of exogenous measures used as22
instruments that are not directly correlated with the fundraising measures.  In the second stage,
we use the predicted level of government funding to measure b.
In searching for a set of instruments, one is interested in a set of measures that explain
government grants directly but not fundraising.  We identified several potential sources of
instruments.  The first set of instruments measures the transfers to all nonprofit organizations by
state and federal governments, measured at the state level. These measures help control for the
size of the government budget that has been spent on nonprofit activities, thus proxy the size of
the pie for which a nonprofit organization competes.  The second set of measures identifies
whether the area in which the organization is located has a member on the United States Senate
and/or House of Representatives appropriations committees.  In the U.S. Congress, the
appropriations committee is charged with developing the budget that must be approved by the
entire Congress and the President.  A member on the committee, thus, has some influence over
the distribution of discretionary funding across the agencies.   The third set of measures identifies
the dollars spent on hotel lodging within a state.  These dollars are a proxy for the level of
tourism in the state, thus identifying the degree to which arts organizations could prosper from
this activity.  The fourth set of measures is government grants to state arts agencies.  This
measure is a proxy for the level of government funding devoted to supporting state arts agencies,
which in turn help support arts organizations.  Finally, we considered total research funding to
the universities in the state from the National Institutes of Health, lagged by one year. This
measure identifies government resources that are being devoted to things other than arts
organizations, thus, providing a proxy for the level or resources that may be available for the
arts.  The measure also identifies the research intensity of universities in a state with respect to23
health research and, thus, providing a proxy for a level of the population that may be more highly
educated and, potentially, a patron of the arts.
To test whether these measures are suitable instruments we looked at the results of two
tests.  First, the F-statistic on the set of instruments in the first stage regression.  This tests the
strength of the instruments to predict government funding.  Second, the over-identification test
from the second stage regression.  This tests the exogeneity of the instruments insofar as the test
identifies whether the instruments can be used to help explain the dependent variable
(fundraising expenditures) after the instruments have been used to predict the level of
government funding.  In addition, we examined whether the coefficient for the government
grants term in the second stage regression was precisely measured using a Hausman (1978) test.
For both types of organizations, we interacted the various measures we tested as
instruments with a set of dummy variables representing the type of organization.  For the arts
organizations, the strongest instruments, as measured by the F-statistic in the first stage
regression, were those that identified the level of research funding to universities by the NIH and
the government transfer payments to nonprofit organizations.  The p-value from the over-
identification test, however, is quite low, suggesting these instruments may belong in the second
stage regression.  Interestingly, across the different sets of instruments tested, the sign and
magnitude of the coefficients on the government funding measure in the second stage regression
were very similar despite these instruments proxy for different aspects of government funding.
19
For the social service organizations, the strongest sets of instruments are those that identify the
level of government transfers to nonprofit organizations and the measures that identify whether
                                                          
19 Although not reported in the tables, if we used the level of government funding to state arts organizations,
interacted with dummy variables for the type of organization, the p-value from the f-statistic is only .08.  The over-
identification test is satisfied (p-value is .80).  The coefficient on the government grants term in the second stage
regression is similar to those reported; however, it is only statistically significant at a p-value less than .10.24
there is a member of Congress on the appropriations committee that represents the congressional
district or state in which the nonprofit is located.  We report, however, only those results that use
the government transfers to nonprofit organizations in the tables.
20  For the IV regression, both
the over-identification and Hausman (1978) tests are satisfied.
Table 3 reports the results from the IV and the Nelson-Olson Tobit IV regressions for the
set of instruments that reflect the NIH funding to universities located in the same state as the
organization, and federal grants to nonprofits in the state Columns (1) to (4) report the results for
the arts organizations, while (5) and (6) report the results for the social service organizations.
The top panel reports the results from the second stage regression.  The middle panel reports F-
statistic on the instruments from the first stage regression.  The bottom panel reports the results
from the over-identification and Hausman (1978) tests.
Looking first at the arts organizations, for both sets of instruments and across the two
types of specifications, the results suggest a negative relationship between government funding
and fundraising efforts.  Notice that the coefficient estimates are quite similar across all
specifications, for both instruments. Given the statistic for the Tobit specification is more
significant than the statistic using the current specification, we will discuss these results.  Using
the government funding to state arts agencies as the instrument, the results suggest that, on
average, a $1000 increase in government grants decreases fundraising expenses by $242.  These
results suggest that given the average government grant to an organization is $1.19 million,
fundraising expenditures decrease, on average, by $289,000 representing a decline of 51 percent
of average fundraising expenditures.
                                                          
20 If we use the congressional measures, because the regression specification utilizes organization fixed effects and
member of Congress typically serve several years on the appropriations committee, we can only study those
organizations for there is a member of Congress that represented the area in which the organization is located and
moved on or off the committee during the period under study.  As such, this reduces the number of organizations25
Turning next to the social service organizations, the results for these organizations are
reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3. The estimates continue to suggest a significant
positive relationship between government grants and fundraising efforts.  Moreover, the
coefficients are larger than the results under the OLS specification.  The coefficients suggest that
an additional $1000 in government grants actually increases fundraising expenditures between
$18 and $19. Given the average government grant is $2.7 million, this would represent an
increase in fundraising expenditures by $50,000, or an increase in average fundraising
expenditures by 28 percent.
What could explain both the positive coefficient on government grants for the social
services groups and the drastic difference between social services and arts organizations? We
explored several potential explanations for these results.  First, we considered the choice to
instrument only the government funding measure and not the program service revenue measure.
If, however, we also instrument the program service revenue, the coefficient on the government
grant measure does not change dramatically for the social service organizations.
 21  Second, we
explored whether using observations for the years around the 1986 tax reform affected the
results.  As Figure 3 suggests, around the time of the tax reform donor, government, and
fundraising behavior for the social service organizations changed dramatically, presumably in
anticipation of the reform.  We, therefore, excluded those observations for the period 1986 and
before, but the results do not change appreciably, suggesting the year effects in the specification
adequately control for the changes in behavior that occurred around 1986.  Third, we explored
further the role of program service revenue on the relationship between government grants and
                                                                                                                                                                                          
that may be included in the IV regression to 285.  The coefficient in the IV regression from this set of instruments is
positive and bigger than that reported in Table 4.26
fundraising efforts.  We suspect that the organizations that rely heavily on program service
revenue may offer several types of goods and services and that the goods provided using
program service revenue may be complementary to the goods provided using government grants
and/or private donations, hence generating a positive relation. Hence, we allowed the coefficient
on the government grants term to be different if a nonprofit organization does not rely heavily on
program service revenue relative to government grants.  The results suggest there is a more
positive coefficient for organizations that rely heavily on program service revenue, but the
difference is not strong.
Finally, we hypothesized that the structure of the development offices of arts and social
services firms may be quite different.  We know that social service organizations rely far more
heavily on government grants than do arts organizations.  Moreover, the nature of these grants is
different across the two organizations.  Arts organizations primarily raise money for specific
short-term project, such as an exhibit or a performance, while grants to social service
organizations are sometimes the defining characteristic of their mission.  Moreover, grants to
social service organizations often look similar to contracts in which government restrictions and
oversight apply. According to The Nonprofit Handbook
22, “Some federal ‘grant’ programs are
really contracts for services and not ‘granted’ funds in the purest sense of the definition. Direct
payments are provided to…private organizations to support a specific service or activity that the
                                                                                                                                                                                          
21 For the arts organizations, when we treat program service revenue (and/or dues and fees) as endogenous, the
coefficients on the government funding and the program service revenue measures are imprecisely measured,
providing no additional information about the relationship between fundraising and government grants.
22 Greenfield, Ed., (2001), The Nonprofit Handbook: Fundraising, Third Edition (pp. 698-99).  This publication is
sponsored by the Association of Fundraising Professionals, and is a reference book for many administrators of
nonprofits.   It also describes “formula grants” that are awarded based on predetermined eligibility requirements.
The nonprofit would report them as grants, but application would be more in the form of paperwork requirements.
Examples of these are Community Service Block Grant Discretionary Awards, Community Food and Nutrition,
Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS, HOME Investment Partnerships, and Special Programs for the
Again.27
federal government wants to provide to benefit the citizenry.”  It further states that, “Some of
these direct payment programs are based on former successful competitive grant projects that
have become institutionalized.”  Hence, social service organizations with larger grants may also
have larger expenses for administration of these grants, and these expenses could be reported as
costs of fundraising, even though they would not meet the definition intended in our theoretical
model.  This would lead to an artificially positive coefficient on grants in equation (4).
Fortunately, our data set allows us to separate the costs of fundraising into three
component parts, representing, on average, more than 50 percent of total fundraising
expenditures.  First are fees paid to independent fundraisers and consultants.  This is the purest
form of fundraising expense and is clearly what was intended in the theory.  Second is the
portion of officers’ salaries attributable to fundraising for accounting purposes.  This number is
prone to variation due to different reporting practices.  Some nonprofits may keep a diary of each
executive’s time, or have officers whose sole task is fundraising, while others may apply a
formula that is a function of the actual funds raised or other costs incurred.
23    Hence, this cost
measure likely is less reliable than the first, but to the extent it is accurately measured it too
should be negatively related to government grants.   Third are the salaries and wages of others
besides officers devoted to fundraising.  This would be precisely measured if organizations
maintained separate fundraising and development offices.   This is where we expect the largest
difference between arts and social service organizations.  We expect many of the costs of
administering and complying with government “grants” may be included here for social service
organizations.  If this is true, then government grants may have a positive influence this category
for social service organizations.
                                                          
23 See Greenfield (2001), Ed., The Nonprofit Handbook: Fundraising, Volume Three, chapter 49 “Accounting for
Contributions,” and chapter 50 “Reading the Internal Revenue Service From 990.”28
Table 4 presents IV regressions for the arts organizations, using the three component
parts of fundraising expenditures as the dependent variable.  As expected, these three fundraising
costs are negatively related to government grants.  Both professional fundraising fees and other
salaries are negatively and significantly related to government grants (but only for the Tobit in
the former).  The coefficient on officers’ salaries, however, is small and imprecisely measured.
Table 5 presents similar regressions for the social services organizations.    These results
now confirm our predictions.  First, professional fundraising fees are negatively and significantly
related to government grants.  A $1000 increase in government grants leads to decrease in
professional fundraising expenses of between $15 and $31.  Given average levels of grants and
expenses, this represents a decline of more than 100 percent in professional fundraising
expenses.
24  Second, the Tobit estimates indicate that expenses on officers’ salaries also decline
by about $10 per $1000 in grants.  This, too, is a significant reduction, both statistically and
practically.  On the other hand, other salaries and wages are positively and significantly related
to government grants.  A $1000 increase in grants leads to a $10 increase in these costs.   Thus, it
appears that the positive effect of other salaries was swamping the negative effect of professional
fees and officers’ salaries in the prior regressions for social services.
25 Taking these three
regressions together, the data are now consistent with a hypothesis that government grants to
social service organizations do indeed crowd out true fundraising efforts of the organizations, as
they do for arts organizations, but grants also increase the administrative costs of the fundraising
offices of social services nonprofits.
                                                          
24 For those organizations that report at least one year of positive professional fundraising expenditures, the average
government grant is $1.83 million.  Given the average effect of a $1000 increase in government grants results in a
decline of between $27,000 and $58,000 in professional fundraising expenditures, at the average, this would be a
decline of more than the average professional fundraising expenditures of  $16,000.
25 Note that many firms reported zero expenses from professional fundraisers or from officers’ salaries, but most
socials services firms reported positive amounts for other salaries.  Hence, even though the coefficients on grants in
table 5 add up to a negative number, when weighted by the number of observations for each, the average is positive.29
V.  Conclusion
When a charitable nonprofit organization receives a grant from the government,
contributions to charities could fall for two reasons.  First, under the classic crowding-out
hypothesis, donors let their involuntary tax contributions substitute for their voluntary
contributions.  This paper raises the prospect of a second reason; that the strategic response of
the charity will be to pull back on its fundraising efforts after receiving a grant.
We explore this idea in two ways.  First, we develop a theoretical model to show that a
charity that chooses its level of fundraising strategically will reduce fundraising in response to
government grants.  If the charitable organizations find fundraising onerous, then the effect is
heightened even more and can happen even if individuals themselves are not crowded out.
Second, we examine this hypothesis empirically.  We use a rich panel data set of
nonprofit organizations, observed for up to 15 years.  We focus on two types of organizations:
arts and social services.  The arts organizations, such as museums or performances groups, get
the majority of their funding from private donations and from program service revenue, such as
ticket sales, and only a relatively small fraction from the government.   The social service
organizations are concerned with families, children, the elderly, the disabled, criminals,
delinquents, and the poor. By contrast, these groups rely primarily on government grants to fund
their operations, and much less on private donations.  These two very different types of
nonprofits provide anchors for our research into the question of whether government funding
crowds out fundraising as well as giving.
When looking at the component parts of fundraising expenses, we find that indeed there
is strong evidence that government grants to nonprofits are causing significant reductions in
fundraising efforts.  This finding is important for two reasons.  First, it means that the behavior30
of the nonprofit organizations is consistent with the predictions of an economic model within a
strategic environment.  This suggests that more sophisticated models of fundraising and
competition in “charity markets” could bear fruit.  Second, and more importantly, it adds an
important new dimension to the policy discussions on the effectiveness of government grants to
increase the services of charitable nonprofit organizations.   Charities are not passive receptacles
of contributions, as they have so often been treated in the past, but are active players in the
market for donations.  When the government gives charities a grant, we should take into account
the behavioral response of the charity itself, as well as the behavioral responses of the individual
donors.
What do our results suggest for policy?  Our findings could provide a rationale for a
policy of awarding so-called matching grants in which a recipient of a government grant is
required to show increased fundraising revenue in order to qualify for additional funds. Such a
policy could directly counteract the negative effects of the grants on fundraising.  On the other
hand, a conclusion that government dollars are allowing a reduction in fundraising expenses may
be seen as socially beneficial.  In particular, fundraising generates deadweight loss, much as
advertising that does not generate demand but rather displaces it to competing brands might do.
Depending on whether the deadweight loss of taxation is more or less than the deadweight loss
of fundraising, then displacing fundraising could possibly improve efficiency.
How should our finding affect future study?  The obvious next question is to ask how
government grants affect donations both directly through classic crowding out and indirectly
through reduced fundraising.  Such a study would help inform theoretical models of giving and
of charitable fundraising and would help formulate better policy toward both givers and
nonprofit organizations.  Also, what are the social costs and benefits of fundraising?  Is31
fundraising a purely wasteful activity or does it provide benefits, such as presenting information
and education to an electorate? A deeper understanding of the costs and consequences
fundraising could be quite valuable for scholars and policy makers.32
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
# Firms # Obs Mean ($millions) Std. Dev CV* Median 75th %
Arts Organizations 245 2492
Fundraising Expenditures 0.563 0.875 1.554 0.301 0.726
   Professional Fundraising 157 1634 0.045 0.123 2.737 0.000 0.029
   Officers’ Salaries towards Fundraising 108 1178 0.029 0.056 1.922 0.000 0.035
   Others’ Salaries towards Fundraising 217 2272 0.231 0.293 1.269 0.143 0.318
Private Donations 5.625 9.972 1.773 2.656 6.809
Government Grants 1.193 2.932 2.458 0.309 0.939
Program service revenue 4.226 7.106 1.681 1.420 5.228
Dues and assessments 0.432 1.170 2.710 0.022 0.334
Donations + Grants 6.817 11.285 1.655 3.329 8.488
Donations + Grants + Service 11.044 15.976 1.447 6.084 13.871
Social Services Organizations 474 4333
Fundraising Expenditures 0.178 0.361 2.025 0.040 0.179
   Professional Fundraising 224 2113 0.016 0.051 3.069 0.000 0.003
   Officers’ Salaries towards Fundraising 143 1367 0.016 0.040 2.571 0.000 0.010
   Others’ Salaries towards Fundraising 368 3449 0.080 0.140 1.748 0.027 0.097
Private Donations 1.725 2.844 1.648 0.630 1.998
Government Grants 2.711 8.557 3.157 0.294 1.853
Program service revenue 5.171 10.843 2.097 1.125 5.457
Dues and assessments 0.553 1.850 3.346 0.000 0.002
Donations + Grants 4.436 9.151 2.063 1.714 4.475
Donations + Grants + Service 9.607 14.710 1.531 4.618 10.783
Note:  All dollars are constant ($1996) and reported in millions.  Private donations cover donations from all private sources; government grants
cover grants from all levels of government (excludes monies received from government contracts)36
Table 2: Relationship Between Fundraising and Government Grants, OLS
Dependent Variable Arts Social Services
  Fundraising Expenditures OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government Grants 9.83 11.70 4.59 4.82
(4.15) (4.09) (1.50) (0.93)
Program Revenue 14.79 14.59 1.70 1.75
(5.57) (3.05) (0.91) (0.73)
Dues & Fees (1 yr lag) 206.65 201.01 -1.49 -5.96
(42.81) (18.25) (7.78) (4.42)
F-statistic on Economic Measures 1.50 0.91 0.95 0.42
   (p-value) (0.17) (0.48) (0.46) (0.87)
F-statistic on Political Measures 0.65 0.90 1.57 2.20
   (p-value) (0.66) (0.48) (0.17) (0.05)
F-statistic on Individual Transfers 3.70 3.52 3.35 4.97
   (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R-square 0.8772 0.8680
Fixed effects Org & Year Org & Year Org & Year Org & Year
# of observations 2492 2492 4333 4333
# of firms 330 330 474 474
Note: All regressions incorporate organization and year fixed effects.  All numbers in parentheses are standard errors unless otherwise noted.  A
bold coefficient is significant at p<.05; a coefficient in italics is significant at a p<.10. Economic, political, and individual transfer measures are at
the state level.  Economic measures: real per capita income, state unemployment rate, percent of population in poverty, percent of population
under 18, percent of population over 65, and state population.  Political measures: percent of members in state upper legislature that are
democratic, percent of members in state lower legislature that are democratic, dummy variable equal to one if governor is democratic, percent of
members in U.S. House of Representatives that are democratic, number of U.S. Senators that are democratic.  Individual transfer measures:
payments to individuals for retirement and disability, Medicare, Medicaid, income maintenance (e.g. SSI, AFDC, food stamps), unemployment
insurance, and veterans’ benefits.37
Table 3: Relationship Between Fundraising and Government Grants, IV
Arts Social Services
Dependent Variable in 2nd Stage IV Nelson-Tobit IV Nelson-Tobit IV Nelson-Tobit
   Fundraising Expenditures (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Government funding -264.50 -242.43 -272.46 -242.78 17.91 19.34
(100.30) (89.42) (110.65) (64.06) (8.80) (2.49)
Program Revenue 24.58 23.75 24.86 23.69 5.52 5.83
(11.07) (4.30) (10.68) (4.07) (2.76) (2.74)
Dues & Fees (1 yr lag) 255.54 246.16 256.96 246.28 0.20 -4.19
(63.68) (23.67) (64.32) (22.69) (7.66) (4.59)
R-square on 2nd Stage 0.6157 0.6003 0.8579
Results from First Stage
Instrument Set (used for both IV & Nelson-Tobit) NIH Grants to Fed Transfers Fed Transfers
Universities to Nonprofits To Nonprofits
1 year lag 1 year lag 1 year lag
F-test on Instruments 5.08 2.81 3.7
  (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Over-id Test 10.27 12.92 8.11
  (degrees of freedom) (3) (7) (7)
  (p-value) (0.02) (0.07) (0.32)
Hausman Test 9.28 9.82 6.73
  (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fixed effects Org & Year Org & Year Org & Year Org & Year
# of observations 2492 2492 4333 4333
# of organizations 245 245 474 474
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses.  A coefficient in bold is significant at p<.05; a coefficient in italics is significant at p<.10.  Other
regressors include political, economic, and individual transfers measures at the state level (see notes to Table 2).  The over-identification test tests
the exogeneity of the instruments in the second stage regression.  The Hausman test determines whether the coefficient from the second stage
regression is statistically different from the coefficient in the first stage regression.  The instruments are measured at the state level and are
interacted with a set of dummy variables that indicate the type of organization within the group of organizations under study (e.g. art museum,
theater, music organization).  NIH grants to universities measures the average federal government grant awarded to the universities located within
the state by the National Institutes of Health.  The federal transfers to nonprofit organizations are total transfers by the federal and state
government to all nonprofits located within the state.38
Table 4:  IV Regressions Using Fundraising Categories, Arts Organizations
Dependent Variable in 2nd Stage Professional Fundraising Fundraising for Officers Fundraising Salaries
IV Tobit IV Tobit IV tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (4)
Government funding -62.86 -82.69 2.14 -4.34 -86.20 -71.39
(42.51) (32.45) (7.85) (3.39) (38.74) (22.91)
Program Revenue 2.33 0.45 1.01 21.33 7.19 7.19
(2.54) (3.17) (0.59) (4.89) (3.47) (1.63)
Dues & Fees (1 yr lag) 9.33 9.22 -1.62 316.94 68.48 65.84
(12.72) (12.75) (3.61) (25.77) (18.94) (9.00)
Results from First Stage
Instruments Gov Transfers NIH Grants to Gov Transfers
to Nonprofits Universities to Nonprofits
1 year lag 1 year lag 1 year lag
F-statistic on Instruments 3.36 3.25 2.77
  (p-value) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Over-id Test 8.43 14.67 15.95
  (degrees of freedom) (3) (3) (3)
  (p-value) (0.30) (0.00) (0.03)
Hausman Test 1.36 0.81 12.39
  (p-value) (0.26) (0.45) (0.00)
Fixed effects Org & Year Org & Year Org & Year Org & Year
# of observations 1634 1178 2272
# of organizations 157 108 217
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses.  A coefficient in bold is significant at p<.05; a coefficient in italics is significant at p<.10.  Other
regressors include political, economic, and individual transfers measures at the state level (see notes to Table 2).    See, also, notes to Table 3.39
Table 5:  IV Regressions Using Fundraising Categories, Social Services Organizations
Social Services Organizations
Dependent Variable in 2nd Stage Professional Fundraising Officer Salaries Other Salaries
IV Tobit IV Tobit IV tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Government funding -15.16 -31.55 0.30 -10.10 10.37 10.62
(5.80) (3.50) (2.95) (1.77) (3.74) (1.36)
Program Revenue -3.72 -7.27 -0.38 -3.45 2.84 2.70
(1.57) (2.63) (0.81) (1.96) (1.18) (1.28)
Dues & Fees (1 yr lag) -1.78 -1.30 -1.13 -3.29 -1.12 -2.63
(2.56) (3.82) (1.05) (1.98) (3.60) (2.31)
Results from First Stage
Instruments Fed Transfers Fed Transfers FedTransfers
To Nonprofits To Nonprofits To Nonprofits
lagged 1 year lagged 1 year lagged 1 year
F-statistic on Instruments 2.41 2.04 3.37
  (p-value) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00)
Over-id Test 4.42 2.27 7.26
  (degrees of freedom) (7) (7) (7)
  (p-value) (0.73) (0.94) (0.40)
Hausman Test 6.68 1.08 6.7
  (p-value) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00)
Fixed effects Org & Year Org & Year Org & Year Org & Year Org & Year Org & Year
# of observations 2113 2113 1367 1367 3449 3449
# of organizations 224 224 143 143 368 368
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses.  A coefficient in bold is significant at p<.05; a coefficient in italics is significant at p<.10.  Other
regressors include political, economic, and individual transfers measures at the state level (see notes to Table 2).    See, also, notes to Table 3.40
Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics for State Level Measures
State level variable Mean Standard deviation
Ratio of democratic to total, State Upper Legislature 0.65 0.16
Ratio of democratic to total, State Lower Legislature 0.64 0.16
Ratio of democratic to total, U.S. House of Representatives 0.56 0.26
Ratio of democratic to total, U.S. Senate 0.53 0.37
Democratic Governor (=1) 0.53 0.50
Real Per Capita Income ($1000s) 20.39 3.61
Unemployment rate (%) 6.39 2.16
% of population in poverty 13.73 4.23
% of population under 18 19.95 2.92
% of population above 65 12.62 1.71
Total state population (millions) 5.48 5.54
Payments for retirement and disability ($billions) 6.79 6.66
Medicare ($billions) 2.85 3.34
Medicaid ($billions) 2.22 3.35
Income maintenance (e.g. SSI, AFDC, food stamps) ($billions) 1.72 2.56
Unemployment insurance ($billions) 0.59 0.80
Veterans benefits ($billions) 0.47 0.42
Federal education and training programs   ($billions) 0.18 0.19
Federal Government transfers to nonprofits ($billions) 0.11 0.12
State Government transfers to nonprofits ($billions) 0.21 0.26